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Dangers of “The Contemporary Orthodoxy”
Abstract
The various unjust discriminations (racism, sexism, xenophobia, etc.) 
that plague society are tied to the larger question of how human lives 
and minds are regarded in society as a whole. Humans have always had a 
problem of mismeasuring the “other,” but this problem is compounded 
by promotion, from powerful voices, of the view that humans are just 
so much physics and chemistry, that the mind is the brain, and that 
humans are deluded about the power of consciousness and freedom. 
Daniel Dennett refers to the latter as “the contemporary orthodoxy,” as 
though it is the view of humanity that all educated people should take 
for granted (many do). On the other hand, there has been something 
of a growing flood of protests against this “orthodoxy,” and it is by no 
means coming only from theologians. This article will review some 
studies that protest what they see as the mismeasuring of humanity, 
and will aim to show that such re-evaluation is essential as an aspect of 
the battle not only against racism and sexism, but also for our amazing 
capacities for love, justice, and peace.
Introduction: Types of Mismeasuring1
Mismeasuring humans is an old habit, and sadly it is still very much 
around, even in the most enlightened circles. In ancient times, tribalism 
and xenophobia were the probable equivalents of what today we usually 
refer to as racism, and, in both ancient and modern times, racism has often 
been connected with violence, including the horrors of genocide. In his 
book The Third Chimpanzee, Jared Diamond (biologist) draws on “biology, 
ethics and psychology” to “understand genocide,” and to explore whether 
the wholesale killing of populations is exceptional or commonplace, 
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whether it is decreasing or not in human history, and whether its 
perpetrators are “normal people.”2  The answers, like the chapter as a whole, 
are all very chilling. But genocide is only the most extreme manifestation of 
mismeasuring humans; it occurs in all forms of sexism and racism. Indeed, 
prosperous white males being granted inordinate privilege is one of the most 
common and enduring forms of mismeasuring. For some, mismeasuring 
results in unearned privilege, for others, in undeserved violence.
 We tend to think of genocidal mismeasuring being the preserve of 
the ignorant or of the viciously cruel. “We,” we tell ourselves, “would never 
do that.” And perhaps we would not, but Jared Diamond suggests that “the 
potential for genocide … lies within all of us.”3 I fear that he is right about 
that, though I would stress the word “potential,” and would insist—for 
reasons that I hope will become clear—that we also have the potential to 
resist evil, and indeed to espouse, even sacrifice ourselves for, the good. Be 
that as it may, I am certain that we have tendencies to mismeasure other 
humans and are guilty of it more than we care to admit.  Our communal 
mismeasuring is the feeding ground that keeps racism and sexism strong.
 
 Further, racist and sexist mismeasuring is compounded by a more 
subtle and scholarly type of mismeasuring—that, at least, is largely my 
thesis. In this essay, I mostly want to discuss the type of mismeasuring, 
which is regularly advocated these days by prominent and quite brilliant 
scholars. I have to emphasize immediately that none of these scholars 
is advocating for racism, sexism, or any other type of violent prejudice. 
Indeed, they would be horrified, probably offended, at my argument 
that their measuring of humanity is a “mismeasuring” that potentially 
has deleterious consequences, not unlike the harmful consequences of 
sexism and racism. I am nevertheless convinced that it is bound to do 
so, since their philosophy—as I will show—amounts to a denigrating of 
mind and consciousness, and eliminating mismeasuring is going to take 
vigorous exercise of the very capacities they throw into doubt. In any event, 
I will make my case, and leave it to my readers to decide whether or not it 
is plausible.
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From Meaningless Universe to Mindless Humans
The roots of the questionable perspective I have in view are very ancient. 
Daniel Dennett (philosopher) points to the Greek philosopher Democritus 
(5th c. BCE), and his philosophy of atomism (i.e. the idea that reality 
comprises only atoms) as an ancient warrant for the view that reality is to 
be defined purely in terms of materiality.4 Like other popular and famous 
writers, Dennett argues that atomism, as refined by modern science, 
requires us to abandon notions of meaning and purpose. Nowadays, not 
just atomism, but also (perhaps especially) evolution convinces many that 
all notions of minds meaningfully pursuing purpose are nonsense. Early in 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Dennett asks whether “any version of this attitude 
of wonder and purpose” can “be sustained in the face of Darwinism,”5 to 
which his book comprises a resounding “No.” To the contrary, he claims:
There is only one sort of stuff, namely matter—the physical stuff of 
physics, chemistry and physiology—and the mind is somehow nothing 
but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain … we 
can (in principle) account for every mental phenomenon using the 
same physical principles, laws and raw materials that suffice to explain 
radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis, reproduction, nutrition 
and growth.6 
This is what Dennett refers to as “the contemporary orthodoxy.” What it 
means, in his view, is that life and its laws emerged as “the outcome of a 
blind, uncaring shuffle through Chaos.”7 Richard Dawkins is similar; the 
universe, he claims, “has precisely the properties we should expect if there 
is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but 
blind, pitiless indifference.”8 
 This claim that the universe comprises “only one sort of stuff,” 
and is therefore blind and meaningless, leads inexorably to the view that 
human beings, specifically human minds, are utterly reducible to the stuff 
of physics and chemistry. Dennett claims, as though it were a dogma 
of science (which it isn’t), that “the mind is the brain.” Edward Wilson 
believes that the human intellect was constructed by evolution simply “to 
promote the survival of human genes,” an idea which, he admits, leads to 
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“the rapid dissolution of transcendental goals toward which societies [or 
individuals] can organize their energies.”9 As Richard Dawkins expresses 
it, “[w]e are built as gene machines,” to whose “music” we “dance.”10 
This philosophy—this interpretation of science—had its most immediate 
forebear in the theory of behaviorism that dominated much of psychology 
in the mid-twentieth century, and which consistently denied the reality of 
consciousness, and so laid the groundwork for notions like “the mind is the 
brain” and that transcendence is an illusion.
 In his recent encyclical On Care for Our Common Home (Laudato 
Si’),11 Pope Francis, echoing Catholic Social Teaching generally, warns 
against philosophies which deny “any pre-eminence to the human person.” 
Philosophies which mistakenly “put all living beings on the same level,” 
depriving “human beings of their unique worth and … responsibility”—
which deny the reality of mind, consciousness, and free will—such 
philosophies too easily lend themselves to “enormous inequalities,” such 
that some consider themselves “more human than others.”12 Where 
humanity as a whole has no transcendence, it is easy for the poor and 
minorities to be denigrated, and for the rich and powerful to claim all the 
specialness for themselves.  
A Self-Contradictory Creed 
Jerry Coyne (biologist) would no more advocate such an idea than would 
any of the other scholars whose ideas I am contesting here. But consider 
the following from a recent interview about his book, Faith Versus Fact: 
Why Science and Religion Are Incompatible (2015). Coyne fully endorses the 
materialist view of reality advocated by Dennett and others, and subscribes 
without question to the notion that the mind is the brain. He was asked in 
the interview why he is so sure humans have no free will, and what are the 
“social consequences” of the belief that they do not:
I can explain it to you in one second why we don’t, and it’s this: our 
brains are made of molecules. Molecules obey the laws of physics. 
Therefore everything that comes out of our brain, including our 
behaviors and choices, must obey the laws of physics. … insofar as 
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those laws apply, everything we do is basically determined. … we 
cannot affect how our brains work by thinking about it, because 
even our thinking is physically-based. … we can’t make a choice. …           
[w]e are physical automatons. … That has enormous consequences for 
how we treat people, for punishment and reward, as well as how we 
regard our own lives. Our feelings of sorrow … will all vanish, as well 
as invidious social consequences like the theory that people are poor 
because they deserve it, or that people get what they deserve in this life. 
… it’s all wrong. People don’t get what they deserve, they get what they 
get because of the laws of physics.13 
 The point of citing this is not to accuse Coyne of advocating what I 
am sure he would regard as abhorrent (abandon the poor and marginalized 
to the fate which “physics” has dealt them). The point is, rather, to show 
how self-contradictory is the philosophy which teaches that humans have 
no “pre-eminence” such that they have no transcendent abilities to rise 
above their limiting conditions, to understand their origins and promise, 
and so to make responsible—even heroic—choices about their lives and 
the lives of others. I do not know the politics of Coyne or of the other 
scholars I am contesting, but I am certain they reject racism, sexism, and 
the other inordinate prejudices which plague human existence.
 And yet their philosophy represents a measuring of humanity—I 
would say a “mismeasuring”—which leaves humans utterly trapped in a 
fate over which they have no control. None of these scholars likes, or even 
subscribes to, this idea. Each, in their own way, somehow comes round 
to the idea that we can escape. For instance, they all write lengthy books 
trying to convince their (presumably somewhat intelligent) readers of the 
rightness of their ideas. So, they must believe that those readers’ minds 
are pliable enough to absorb the utterly counterintuitive view that, in 
reality, their (the readers’) minds do not exist. Dawkins’ attempt to escape 
is illustrative of the general trend, and will be useful for later discussion. 
Dawkins thinks that “we, and all other animals, are machines created by 
our genes.” We are, therefore, liable to “ruthless selfishness,” and are capable 
only of “a limited form of altruism.” “Universal love,” he says, simply does 
“not make evolutionary sense;” in fact, “pure, disinterested altruism … has 
no place in nature,” and “has never existed before in the whole history of the 
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world.” And yet, somehow, he believes we should “try to teach generosity 
and altruism,” and even says that we are capable of cultivating it.14 But how 
are we to teach something which is not only contrary to nature, but “has 
never existed before in the whole history of the world”? Dawkins here, like 
other materialist thinkers, simply does not follow his own creed. Indeed, 
we might begin to suspect that the creed15 itself makes no sense.
 And we should note, before moving on, that the materialist creed 
is just that—a creed. It is not science. Of course, it wraps itself in the cloak 
of science, and speaks as though materialism follows from atomism and 
evolution as naturally as night follows day. But the view that all reality 
is definable in terms of materiality is as much a matter of faith as is any 
(more obviously religious) doctrine to the contrary. How we (mis)measure 
reality has everything to do with how we (mis)measure humanity. There 
is no science that could even examine whether reality amounts only to 
materiality, much less prove or disprove it. A contrary (not necessarily 
religious) view to materialism is idealism, by which I do not mean to 
invoke the numerous idealist-type philosophies of the (mostly) nineteenth 
century; I mean simply the fundamental notion that reality is at least as 
much mind-like as it is stuff-like. Keith Ward (Christian philosopher) 
defines idealism as the view that reality is “founded … on some form of 
purposive consciousness.”16 Idealism, of course, is no more ultimately 
provable than is materialism; I maintain, however, that it is a far more 
reasonable theory in terms of accounting for all of the evidence than is 
materialism. Ultimately, however, the decision comes down to faith and 
commitment.17 
 “Faith and commitment” are essential in this entire debate—on 
both sides. Materialists generally believe that physical stuff and laws account 
for, and thus control, everything, and therefore they are committed to the 
notion that only physics, chemistry, and biology should be allowed to 
guide human action. Materiality, for them, is the “measure” of everything, 
even mind and free will. Sam Harris, a very committed-to-atheism 
neuroscientist, wrote The Moral Landscape to demonstrate that science 
is all that is needed for ethical decision-making.18 He is vigorous in his 
view that religion is evil. Edward Wilson is not as vitriolic toward religion, 
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but he is clear that biology alone can guide moral action.19 In Wilson’s 
account, “universal human rights”20 are identified as a “primary value,” but 
the “true reason” for it, he says, is its “raw biological causation.” Once the 
latter is recognized, it will be found far more compelling, he thinks, than 
“any rationalization contrived by culture.” In other words, we won’t value 
human rights because of lessons learned from past violence and warfare, 
or from the inspirational teachings of a Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., 
or Jesus. No, it will be because “we are mammals” who value “personal 
reproductive success” and grant one another “grudging cooperation” so 
that we can “enjoy the benefits of group membership.”21
 Apart from the inherent implausibility of fighting the evils of war or 
racism on the basis of concerns about “reproductive success” and/or “group 
membership,” note again the self-contradiction in which this philosophy 
is inevitably mired. Biology has no capacity to tell us that we should grant 
people their “rights” as a “primary value.” Biology is utterly blind to values; 
human values are not why we do biology. People do biology; biology is 
their servant, not their master, and whether they interpret biology to 
foster human rights is why people do philosophy, not biology. Why would 
thinking people ever allow “raw biological causation” to be the ground of 
their ethical values or their policies about “human rights”? Wilson only 
talks in that way because he wants to preserve two contradictory ideas: 
1) “Raw biological causation” (we have no capacity for “transcendental 
goals”), and 2) We should follow only the dictates of biology (not of, say, the 
“transcendental goals” of religion). It takes only a little thought to recognize 
that the power to decide whether or not we value human rights, and what 
is the best way to implement them, presupposes the transcendence that 
Wilson denies. My contention is that we need to measure humanity not 
only by the criteria of the natural sciences—valuable as they are—but also 
by those of the humanities. Humans have the ability to rise above limiting 
conditions and to make judgments about how best to overcome them. 
This raises the issue of what human consciousness is, and brings us to some 
scholars who strongly reject the philosophy of materialism.22
11                  No. 29 – 2016
Protests Against Mismeasuring   
There are numerous such scholars, of course, just as there are numerous 
advocates of materialism. I will briefly focus here on a few scholars, 
representative of many more (see note 22), who were (are) profoundly 
engaged in both the scientific and the philosophical issues of what constitutes 
a human being. Roger W. Sperry (1913-1994) was a neuroscientist, 
who won the Nobel Prize (along with others) for split-brain research 
(the functions and relationship of the right and left brain hemispheres). 
Already from the 1960’s, Sperry began reacting against behaviorism and 
particularly its theory that the mind is the brain. Sperry wrote numerous 
books and even more numerous scholarly articles; he also received many 
science awards beyond the Nobel Prize. Short quotations from just one 
article, and from a book about Sperry’s ideas, will have to suffice here to 
make the point.  
 Sperry had no theological agenda; as far as I can tell, he was an 
agnostic (maybe atheist). He believed that science could provide a basis for 
ethical decision-making (see note 17), but it could only do so, he insisted, 
so long as it was not tied to a materialist, reductionist philosophy:
Once science modifies its traditional materialist-behaviorist stance 
and begins to accept in theory and to encompass in principle within 
its causal domain the whole world of inner conscious, subjective 
experience (the world of the humanities), then the very nature of 
science itself is changed.23
Sperry was convinced that science, as a method of inquiry, was vitiated 
by materialist philosophy. Particularly, the understanding of the human 
mind could not, he believed, properly proceed on the conviction that the 
mind is the brain and has no existence apart from brain-chemistry. In 
other words, long before Coyne, and with an expertise that Coyne himself 
admits he does not have,24 Sperry rejected the view that there is no such 
thing as free will.  
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 Basing himself on the concept of emergence (more on this below) 
and recent research, Sperry wrote an article on the “The Consciousness 
Revolution” in which he described not only why behaviorism is no longer 
adequate for understanding the mind, but why the recent findings of 
neuroscience should lead to the abandonment of a view of science as 
dominated by materialism. “In the final analysis,” he wrote, “we come 
down to two opposing views of physical reality, two different worldviews,” 
materialism or mentalism. By “mentalism,”25 he simply meant the notion 
that “things are controlled not only from below upward by atomic and 
molecular action but also from above downward by mental, social, political 
and other macro properties.”26 In other words, humans have the capacity 
for freedom. It was essential, he thought, to overcome a purely materialist 
(the-mind-is-the-brain) philosophy, since such a view prevents science 
from making its essential contribution to the moral challenges facing 
society. Human values, he believed, flourish best when ethics can draw 
on the entirety of human knowledge, science no less than the humanities. 
Materialism is inadequate for measuring either the world or humanity.
 In that regard, Sperry shared a lot in common with Michael Polanyi 
(1891-1976), and in fact regarded Polanyi as the scholar with whom he 
had the most in common.27 Polanyi was a scientist-turned-philosopher. 
He was horrified by the perversion of scientific knowledge in Soviet Russia 
and Nazi Germany, and feared that materialist thinking was becoming 
prevalent throughout industrialized societies.28 Having spent the first part 
of his life studying and teaching chemistry, he turned increasingly in its 
second half to philosophy, specifically epistemology (how do humans attain 
knowledge?). He rejected the view that life is reducible to the definitions of 
physics and chemistry, and believed that the prevailing objectivist view of 
science lay at the root of much of the malaise in the Western world.29
 Like Sperry, Polanyi drew on the concept of emergence for his 
understanding of reality. Emergence is a concept of physics, but it has 
also become an important idea in philosophy. Emergence accounts for 
“novelties [in nature] that follow from the system rules but cannot be 
predicted from properties of the components that make up the system.”30 
Think for instance, in the very early universe, of the properties which we 
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study in chemistry “emerging” from (what we call) physics. More germane 
to this essay, think of the numerous levels of emergence, which have been 
necessary in order for life, mind, and human values to emerge from the 
rock, fire, and water of the Earth. That creativity of the universe led Polanyi 
to the view that life has an inherently purposeful character—not a view 
that is popular among biologists.31 
 Be that as it may, Polanyi is most revered for his philosophy of mind. 
He was horrified by behaviorism and its diminution (its mismeasuring), as 
he saw it, of the powers of the mind. Behaviorism deals with the brain as a 
mechanism, and things like mind-altering drugs seem to confirm the point. 
Polanyi accepts that a person is a mechanism, and then shows that precisely 
as a mechanism, a person (or any living thing) is a hierarchy, comprising 
numerous levels of (emergent) reality. A simple mechanism, like a watch, 
illustrates the point. It functions by operational principles that have 
nothing to do with physics and chemistry. These principles were imposed 
on the parts of the watch by a watchmaker, and so hard science “cannot 
reveal the practical principles embodied in a machine, any more than the 
physical chemical testing of a printed page can tell the content of its text.”32 
Physics and chemistry provide the conditions for the watch’s functioning, 
and may account for its failure (if it rusts or whatever), but they cannot 
account for it being a watch. And what is true of simple mechanisms is all 
the more true of living beings; they function by principles far beyond the 
realms of physics and chemistry. The distance between the physico-chemical 
composition of a page on which is written a Shakespearean sonnet and the 
meaning of the words on that page is precisely the distance between seeing 
a person as so much physics and chemistry (merely a machine) and seeing 
that person as a person, who lives by realities far beyond those described by 
the hard sciences.
 Other recent scholars, who have made much of opposing 
materialist views of reality, and thus of views of human beings, which deny 
the reality of consciousness and free will, include Thomas Nagel (atheist 
philosopher) and Raymond Tallis (atheist neuroscientist).33 I stress their 
“atheist” credentials, because I want to show that the deep questioning of 
materialism is not simply the preserve of the religious or of theologians. As 
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I have tried to show, materialism has deep flaws, regardless of its obvious 
hostility to theist views of reality. Tallis refers to the excessive conclusions 
drawn from Darwin and neuroscience as “Darwinitis” and “Neuromania”; 
they are, as he sees them, foolish and shallow misreadings of modern 
science, and mismeasurings of humanity. He says at one point:
Things must be pretty dire when even an atheist like me wants to 
rescue, if not God, at least the idea of Him (or Her or It). But it’s 
true. Neuromaniac and Darwinitic approaches to religion do such 
inadequate justice to the most profound, and possibly the most terrible, 
idea mankind has ever entertained, that I feel almost protective toward 
the Old One.34
After briefly, and half-heartedly, defending “the Old One,” Tallis critiques 
(not for the first time in the book) the claim of Sam Harris that brain scans 
demonstrate that religious beliefs are nothing more than brain chemistry. 
He concludes: 
What motivates Harris and some other neuro-theologians [scholars 
using neuroscience to prove theology to be delusional] is the wish to 
cut religion down to size. The trouble is that this diminishes not only 
religious belief, but also diminishes all kinds of belief and, indeed, 
diminishes humans as believers. Irrespective of whether you are an 
atheist or a religious believer, to naturalize one of the greatest (for good 
or ill) and most extraordinary expressions of our distinctive humanity 
cannot be a good thing.
Conclusion: The Human Vocation    
We need liberation from ideologies that would confine us to the level of 
the physical every bit as much as we need liberation from the worst of 
religious fanaticism. Neither dogma is worthy of the depth and beauty 
of the human spirit. In 1994, over the course of about a hundred days, 
eight hundred thousand people—mainly Tutsis—were slaughtered in the 
Rwanda genocide. The following year, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who 
was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1984 for his nonviolent struggle 
against the humiliations of apartheid in South Africa, went to Rwanda in 
his capacity as president of the All Africa Conference of Churches. The 
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message he preached was, “no future without forgiveness.”35 He knew 
what he was talking about, since in the previous years—at the behest of 
Nelson Mandela—he had headed South Africa’s “Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission,” whose charge was both to uncover the atrocities of the 
apartheid period and, far from seeking revenge, to bring about peace, 
reconciliation, and even forgiveness. Even so, it was a stunning message: 
forgive those who slaughtered your family and friends!  
 Those of us spared such horrific experiences as apartheid and 
genocide can barely grasp the concept, and yet we know—though 
we cannot prove—the truth of what Tutu, Mandela, and others have 
embodied by their lives of courage and sacrifice. We know that violence, 
hatred, and revenge hold no future for the human animal. We know, as 
surely as we know ourselves, that our humanity has capacities for love, as 
it has capacities for forgiveness, justice, and hope. Our capacities, however, 
are not automatically realized; we must begin by believing in them.36 
How we measure or mismeasure ourselves and the humanity of which we 
are each a part has everything to do with whether or not we will ever rid 
ourselves of the horrors of racism and sexism, and of the violence that they 
so easily spawn.
Notes 
1. I should acknowledge that I am indebted to the late Stephen 
Jay Gould and his book The Mismeasure of Man for my use 
of the word “mismeasuring.” This essay accords with the 
spirit of Gould’s book, but I make no claim that he would 
agree with my philosophy, much less my theology. Gould 
was something of a materialist.
2. See the chapter entitled, “In Black and White,” 276-309, 
here 277-278.
3. Diamond, Third Chimpanzee, 308.
4. Dennett, Freedom Evolves, 7-8.
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5. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 18.
6. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 33. See also Dawkins, 
River Out of Eden, 133, and Wilson, On Human Nature, 
Consilience and other books.
7. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 185.
8. Dawkins, River Out of Eden, 133.
9. Wilson, On Human Nature, 2-3, 4, respectively.
10. Dawkins, Selfish Gene, 201, and River Out of Eden, 133. 
Dawkins nevertheless goes on to admit that “we have the 
power to rebel against our creators” (genes and memes—Selfish 
Gene, 201), which is something of a self-contradiction—a 
feature, as I shall argue below, that characterizes much of  
this thinking.
11.  Laudato Si’ means “Praise be to you [my Lord].” This is a 
quotation from a prayer of St. Francis of Assisi, and it 
constitutes the opening words of the encyclical.
12. Pope Francis, Laudato Si’ #90. Note also the following, in 
which Francis laments the modern “technocratic paradigm” 
(#106) and an “excessive anthropocentrism” (#116) which 
have “led to a constant schizophrenia, wherein a technocracy 
which sees no intrinsic value in lesser beings coexists with 
the other extreme, which sees no special value in human 
beings. But one cannot prescind from humanity. There can 
be no renewal of our relationship with nature without a 
renewal of humanity itself. There can be no ecology without 
an adequate anthropology. When the human person is 
considered as simply one being among others, the product 
of chance or physical determinism, then ‘our overall sense of 
responsibility wanes.’ … Human beings cannot be expected to 
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feel responsibility for the world unless, at the same time, their 
unique capacities of knowledge, will, freedom and responsibility 
are recognized and valued” (#118—emphasis added. Francis 
quotes from Benedict XVI, “Message for the 2010 World 
Day of Peace”).
13. Available at http://fivebooks.com/interview/jerry-coyne-on-
the-incompatibility-of-religion-and-science/.
14.  Selfish Gene, 2-3, 200-201.
15. This argument is well articulated by Haught, Is Nature 
Enough?, 97.
16. Ward, Big Questions, 183.
17. Insofar as they have such utter faith in the materialist creed, 
it seems to me that Dawkins, Dennett, Coyne, and Wilson 
are, in their own way, every bit as religious as ordinary 
churchgoers.
18. He also has written a book on Free Will, denying that any 
such thing is actually real. How, therefore, he thinks we 
can employ science (presumably, determine values based 
on scientific knowledge) for ethical decisions, is utterly 
mysterious.
19. I should emphasize that I agree with the notion that evolution 
is essential for understanding the moral nature of human 
beings (e.g. emotions and the development of altruism) 
and therefore has a role in ethics. What I am contesting is 
the view that science alone is sufficient for ethical decision-
making.
20. He must be referring to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of the United Nations, which is easily available at 
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www.un.org. It includes in its preamble: “Whereas the 
peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed 
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of 
men and women …” Surely this declaration of “faith” is 
completely cultural, deriving from lessons learned from wars 
and genocides; how could it be improved by reducing its 
motivation to biology?
21. On Human Nature, 198-199. Wilson is not a lone voice in 
this view; witness the fact that his book received a Pulitzer 
prize, not to mention the supporting chorus of voices like 
Harris, Dawkins, Dennett, and others.
22. To name a few: Stephen M. Barr (Catholic physicist), 
Ian Barbour (Professor of Physics and Religion), Francis 
Collins (Christian geneticist), Paul Davies (mathematical 
physicist), John Haught (theologian), Martinez Hewlett 
(biologist), Alister McGrath (scientist turned theologian), 
Kenneth Miller (Catholic biologist), Thomas Nagel 
(atheist philosopher), Arthur Peacocke (theologian and 
biochemist), Ted Peters (theologian), Michael Polanyi                       
(scientist turned philosopher), John Polkinghorne (physicist 
and theologian), Roger Sperry (agnostic neuroscientist), 
Raymond Tallis (atheist neuroscientist).
23. Quoted in Erdmann and Stover, Beyond a World Divided, 
29.
24. See the interview at http://www.skeptiko.com/161-
outspoken-atheist-jerry-coyne/.
25. Sperry, Consciousness Revolution, 44.
26. Sperry, Consciousness Revolution, 45.
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27. Erdmann and Stover, Beyond a World Divided, 149.
28. Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society, 7-9, 78.
29. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 139-142; “On the Modern 
Mind,” 12-13.
30. Morowitz, Emergence, 13.
31. Polanyi was well aware of this, and forthrightly disagreed 
with the biologists of his time—e.g. “The Modern Mind.” 
Recently, Pross (biologist), What is Life?, 9-23, has written 
forcefully of “Life’s purposeful” and “dynamic character;” life 
(unlike physics and chemistry) “has an agenda.”
32. Polanyi, “On the Modern Mind,” 14.
33. Nagel, Mind and Cosmos (2012); Tallis, Aping Mankind 
(2011).
34. Tallis, Aping Mankind, 327.
35. Tutu, “No Future without Forgiveness,” 390-396.
36. Parts of this essay have depended on research and writing 
I have done elsewhere —notably Smiles, “Persons Knowing 
Life,” and “Transcendent Mind.” This last section was mostly 
taken from my book, The Bible and Science, 132-133.
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